When Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud was crown prince of Saudi Arabia, one of his most infamous decisions was banning the use of camera phones in 2004 – a demand from the country's Wahhabi clergy who claimed the devices were "spreading obscenity."
But the decision was quickly reversed when King Abdullah faced pressure from his government ministers and, allegedly, from a cadre of foreign businessmen who threatened to pull their companies from Saudi Arabia. "Abdullah was presented with a choice between the Wahhabis and good business," says one Riyadh-based businessman. "His decision [for the latter] was clear."
It is a decision that Abdullah has made time and again over the course of his reign as king, which hit its two-year mark this month. By sidelining the traditional clergy in favor of the merchant classes and more progressive religious voices, Abdullah has been challenging the "great bargain" of the Saudi state – namely the empowerment of the Wahhabi ulema (hard-line Islamic scholars) in exchange for their sanction of the House of Saud.
This unlikely reformer, who has unofficially led the kingdom since King Fahd's stroke in 1995, has propelled the country through a radical transformation. From accession to the World Trade Organization to the billion-dollar overhaul of the educational system to increased criticism of the religious "police" who enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law, the closed kingdom is beginning to crack open.
'The oil boom is over'
These reforms come at a critical time. Saudi Arabia is barreling toward an economic and social crisis if it does not act fast. Almost 75 percent of Saudi citizens are under age 30 and youth unemployment is approaching 30 percent – a potential breeding ground for terrorists and regime dissidents. Current high oil prices are not enough to paper over the economic ravages of the past two decades. "The oil boom is over and will not return," Abdullah told his subjects. "All of us must get used to a different lifestyle."
Economic restructuring of the kingdom is no easy task, nor can it be separated from social reform, such as increasing women's participation in economic life and creating a business environment and laws suitable for foreign companies.
Faced with resistance from the conservative official ulema, Abdullah has adopted a strategy of "circumvention" to coerce these reforms – officially toeing the Wahhabi line, but quietly giving more leeway to the private sector.
Education, for example, had traditionally been firmly under Wahhabi control, with a focus on creating more imams than businessmen. But this won't help a country striving to become an international powerhouse. So private universities – previously shunned by the religious elite because of their relative independence – have recently been legalized, with a half-dozen Western-style institutions slated to open soon. The new King Abdullah University for Science and Technology, the kingdom's first coeducational institution, is an Abdullah initiative to create a global leader in technological innovation. He tasked the relatively secular Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources with running the project, keeping it away from the fundamentalists.
By sidelining the ulema, Abdullah has been forced to find a new source for religious legitimacy in order for him and his successors to rule over "the land of the two holy mosques."
His strategy has been to allow a wider base of voices to speak for Islam, both Sunni and Shiite. He instituted an annual forum titled "National Dialogue," which invited a variety of prominent intellectuals to make their views heard.
The forum included Sunni scholars such as Safar al Hawali, a former member of an opposition grouping called the "Awakening Sheikhs," many of which had been previously imprisoned for their biting criticism of palace policy.
Other invitees included prominent Shiite thinkers – a distinct change from earlier years, when the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia had declared Shiites to be "apostates." Most important, the official ulema were pointedly left off the guest list.
Some have criticized the weak translation of the forum's rhetoric into real action. Yet even its existence is an accomplishment, and a new building has been set up in Riyadh to host this forum. This is a sign, in the words of Saudi Arabia expert Jean-François Seznec, of how the "National Dialogue" is becoming "systematized and routinized," reflecting long-term changes in the regime's attitude.
Of course, Abdullah's reforms have been highly limited when compared with Western expectations.
The country is still an iron-fisted dictatorship: The much-heralded municipal elections of 2005 excluded women, and the trumpeted majlis (parliament) remains a body undemocratically appointed by the king. Women can't drive, and religious freedom is nonexistent. Fundamentalist forces also remain significant in the kingdom, with characters such as Prince Naif, the ultra-conservative interior minister, still wielding enormous power.
Economic impetus for reform
At 83 years old, Abdullah's time left in office may be short, and it is uncertain that those next in line to the throne will have the will or the ability to continue making crucial reforms.
The challenges facing the desert kingdom require highly tuned maneuvering skills. Reformers are counting on the durability of Abdullah's reforms regardless of his successor. His legacy is likely to be protected by the new economic elite he is helping to create.
"You can't bury your head in the sand and expect to become a global economic power," said one administrator at a new Western-style university in Saudi Arabia. "The king knows this, and he's ready to accept the consequences of reform."
• Dana Moss is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Transatlantic Institute in Brussels. Zvika Krieger is a Middle East-based special correspondent for Newsweek magazine.
Here's One You Might Find (If You're Lucky) Nestled in Tiny Print on a Back Page of the New York Times
How to Raise Revenue
Wall Street Journal
August 24, 2007
The Congressional Budget Office reported yesterday that the famously fearsome budget deficit is plummeting almost as fast as Congress's approval ratings. The deficit this fiscal year is expected to be $158 billion, a meager 1.2% of GDP. Since the Bush tax cuts of 2003, the budget deficit has fallen by $217 billion mostly because of a continuing torrid pace of revenue growth.
Quite a success story, but one that isn't likely to be embraced by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel of New York. Last week he gave a sneak preview of his tax strategy for this fall by announcing he wants to put "more equity into the system." Mr. Rangel then provided the translation: It's time, he says, to "take a look at the upper [marginal tax] rate to see if there can be a more equitable distribution of the tax."
OK, let's talk equity. It's almost an article of faith on Capitol Hill these days that the Bush tax cuts tilted the income tax system in favor of the rich. If this were true, it would be reflected in the actual data on the distribution of the income tax.
For the Bush tax cuts to have been a give-away to the rich, people paying the higher marginal tax rates would have to be carrying a smaller share of the income tax load. But the IRS data indicate that they are not paying less. Instead, they are paying more -- lots more. More surprisingly, the richest 1%, 5% and 10% of the taxpayers are shouldering a larger percentage of the income tax burden at the federal level than the tax estimators said they would had the Bush tax cuts never materialized. The data nearby tell the story.
The preliminary 2005 data just released from the Treasury Department show more of the same. The amount of tax paid by those earning more than $1 million a year increased to $236 billion in 2005, up from $132 billion in 2003, the year of the tax cut. This was a 78% increase in taxes paid by millionaire households.
Another indication of the expanded tax base is that after the tax cuts there were more millionaires for Uncle Sam to tax. In 2003 about 182,000 Americans declared gross income of $1 million or more. In 2005 the number of millionaire households leapt to 300,000. The number of Americans with declared income of $10 million or more doubled to 13,000 from 6,000 in the years after the tax rate cuts. This is a "problem" only if Democrats have come to believe that earning money is an ignoble pursuit.
The boom in the stock and housing markets clearly had a lot to do with the expansion in the number of millionaires in America, but lower tax rates on capital gains and dividends also caused a huge jump in reported income. The National Bureau of Economic Research found an "unprecedented surge in regular dividend payments after the 2003" Bush tax cut. Likewise, the lowering of the capital gains tax was followed by a 150% increase in the amount of capital gains unlocked by the 15% tax rate. Lower tax rates expanded the tax base.
We hope that before "putting more equity into the system" Mr. Rangel also takes a look at the longer term picture on revenues and tax rates, because it shows that raising tax rates may not be a wise strategy. With a few exceptions, tax rates in America have been steadily falling for the past 25 years starting with the Reagan tax cuts of 1981. When Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office in 1981, the highest tax rates on income, capital gains and dividends were roughly twice as high as today. The top marginal income tax rate in 1981, for example, was 70% compared to 35% today. These tax rate reductions haven't meant that the rich have escaped paying their "fair share" of taxes or that the burden has shifted to the middle class. The opposite has occurred. Over the past 25 years tax payments by the wealthy have continually risen almost in inverse proportion to the tax rates, as shown by the surprising results below. The real bite on the middle class comes from payroll and state taxes; include them and their tax share rises relative to the wealthy. So yes, cut those taxes, too.
The supply-side revenue effects on the rich are remarkable: Tax rates on higher incomes have been halved, but the federal tax share of the top 1% has nearly doubled. And the budget deficit has fallen. That's what happens when tax policy gets the incentives right.
08:02 PM in Politics / Commentary | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)